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Abstract 
Measuring energy security or resilience in energy is, in the main, confined to indicators which are 
used for comparative purposes or to show trends rather than provide empirical evidence of 
resilience to unpredicted crises. In this paper, the electricity systems of the individual states within 
the United States of America are analysed for their response to the 1973-1982 and the 2003-2012 oil 
price shocks. Empirical evidence is sought for elements which are present in systems that experience 
reduced volatility from the energy shocks in the form of lower prices. Spare capacity is found to be a 
reliable indicator of reduced prices through both periods whilst renewable energy is found to be an 
indicator of reduced prices especially in 1973-1982.  
Keywords 
Resilience metrics; Energy Security; Electricity; Renewable Energy 
1. Introduction 
Economic stability is reliant on effective energy systems which in turn need to be resilient to the 
unexpected. Resilience as a concept has been researched across disciplines and is associated with 
sustainability and robustness, but it is difficult to measure. Several disciplines have advanced models 
for the measurement of resilience or the ability to respond to the unpredictable. Portfolio theory 
(PT), developed for the investment community, measures the risk of an investment portfolio 
(Markowitz, 1952). The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) built on Markowitz’s theory to optimise 
a portfolio by diversifying assets based on their risk premiums relative to market performance 
(Sharpe, 1964). These models are widely used to measure risk (Fama and French, 2004; Hwang et al., 
2012).  
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In Psychology, the literature on resilience has sought to identify parameters that are associated with 
positive outcomes through principal component and factor analysis (Ungar, 2012). In Ecology, 
research has identified the parameters of diversity, redundancy and system integrity as important 
for resilience, although no model has emerged to predict resilience (Carpenter et al., 2001). Network 
theorists have focused on the structure of a system, indicating its ability to withstand error, failure 
or attack (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Albert et al., 2000). In the field of energy, security is measured 
by combining relevant indicators which point to risks associated with affordable, available, 
accessible and acceptable supply of energy (Kruyt et al., 2009). Whilst all of these disciplines deal 
with risk and survival, there is little consistency between their approaches and, in the main, little 
evidence of their efficacy. 
The questions that need to be answered to gain insight into resilience in energy are: what role 
diversity, redundancy and structure play in forging resilience; and what predictive models are best 
suited to provide this insight. In this paper two analytical frameworks will be used to construct 
models for predicting resilience in electricity systems.  Firstly, PT will be assessed for its ability to 
predict electricity prices in recognition of research proposing PT for risk optimisation (Awerbuch and 
Berger, 2003; Awerbuch et al., 2008; Bolinger and Wiser, 2008). This will be followed by an 
assessment of the ability of a Resilience Index (RI) to predict electricity prices, in recognition of 
research into the potential for national electricity systems to facilitate electricity intensive industry 
(Molyneaux et al., 2012). To assess the effectiveness of these two methods in predicting good 
outcomes, their prediction accuracy during periods of large energy shocks will be evaluated. 
Analysis of state electricity systems in the United States of America (US) provides data and context 
to measure resilience as the systems provide evidence of diverse system performances over a 40 
year period. The methods of the analysis are outlined in Section 2, the results in Section 3, with 
section 4 providing discussion around the results. In section 5 the study concludes with policy 
recommendations on the significant findings. 
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2. Methods 
The primary research tool is multiple linear regression analysis which assumes a linear relationship 
between the explanatory variables of the PT and RI models and the dependent variable, electricity 
price. 
2.1. Data source 
The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) provides detailed energy information in its State Energy 
Database System (SEDS) 1970-2012i. Electricity capacity and generation data by year, state and plant 
is sourced from the EIA’s Form759.  
2.2. Price as the dynamic variable 
Ecologists argue that fast variables show the dynamics of the underlying structural variables 
(Carpenter et al., 2001) although stability in variables is not considered a predictor of resilience 
(Holling, 1973).  However ecosystems need to keep functioning despite volatility in elements. 
Applying these arguments to electricity systems, price represents the fast variable as it reflects the 
dynamics of the structure.  Thus, if price can show levels of stability, despite volatility in structural 
variables, then this is evidence of resilience in a system such as the electricity supply system. 
2.2.1. Which price to measure 
Electricity assets are large, expensive, enduring and relatively inflexible. Prices reflect not just 
changes in current input costs, but decades of infrastructure expenditure. Price is chosen as the 
dependent variable rather than change in price due to the long-term nature of generation fleets. 
Measuring change in price fails to incorporate the impacts of prior period performance. Thus, price 
provides a metric of value associated with the industry, and captures the role of historical and 
current structural components in influencing that value.  
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The price of electricity to industry is used as a proxy for wholesale price. Industry price is used in 
preference to the average price across all consumer classes to exclude the varying costs associated 
with distribution to residential customers.  
Electricity prices in the US 1970-1990 were subject to regulation which reflected the public mood of 
antipathy to price instability. Although price in any year is a reflection of prior period changes, prices 
in 1982 do not necessarily reflect the lumpy transition from 1973 to 1982. Figure 1 shows the ratio 
of industry price in 1982 to the weighted average of industry price 1973-1982.  States like 
Washington and Oregon saw a single sharp increase in price in 1982 due to nuclear power 
development which is not representative of price 1973-1982. It is therefore more appropriate to 
measure the weighted average price for industry for the periods analysed.
 
Figure 1: The ratio of the price of electricity to industry in 1982 and the weighted average industry price 1973-1982 
Throughout the analysis, real prices are used to differentiate from movements in the general level of 
prices. Real prices are calculated using nominal prices adjusted for CPI, as detailed in Equation 1: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2012 =  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛 𝑋 
𝐶𝑃𝐼2012
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑛
 
(1) 
where   
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2012 = Real price (expressed in 2012 dollars)  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛 = Nominal price in year n  
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑛 
𝐶𝑃𝐼2012 
= Consumer price index in year n 
= Consumer price index in 2012 
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2.3. Portfolio Theory as a model for electricity price prediction 
PT is premised on volatility in prices indicating risk. Applied to a fleet of electricity generators, the 
risk associated with each fleet is based on the effects of fuel cost volatility.  This risk metric is 
analysed for its ability to predict electricity price during an energy shock.  
2.3.1. Calculating PT risk 
PT assumes that the risk of the portfolio is measured by the variance of return of each security and 
by the covariance of returns between each pair of securities (Dobbins et al., 1994). Applying this 
model to an electricity system, generation fuel is substituted for security to establish the risk 
inherent in the system from fuel cost volatility. The five-fuel-source model is shown in Equation 2: 
 
𝑉(𝑅) = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝜎𝑖
2 + 2 ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑖 
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑃𝑗𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
 (2) 
Where:  
𝑉(𝑅) Variance in price of the generation portfolio 
𝑃𝑖  Proportion of generation from fuel type i   
𝜎 𝑖
2 Variance in cost of fuel type i  
𝑟𝑖𝑗 Covariance in cost between fuel types i and j  
i, j Fuels: coal (CL), natural gas (NG), uranium (NU), oil (PA), renewable 
(RE) 
  
2.3.2. PT risk regression model 
The PT risk model for regression analysis is specified in Equation 3. 
 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉(𝑅)𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠 (3) 
where   
𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 = Weighted average price to industry in state s  
𝛽0 = ESICDKR intercept  
𝛽1 = coefficient of  𝑉(𝑅)𝑠   
𝑉(𝑅)𝑠 = variance in price of generation portfolio for state s  
𝜀𝑠 = random error in ESICDKR for state s  
2.3.3. Disaggregated PT risk regression model 
An aggregated PT risk metric may mask the impact of individual metrics, so PT risk is disaggregated 
into its component metrics to yield insights into which variables exert most influence. Table 1 shows 
the disaggregated PT risk explanatory variables: 
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Table 1: Risk metrics as explanatory variables 
Risk metric Regression Variable name Variable calculation 
Coal price TERM_RISK_CL 𝑃𝑐𝑙
2 𝜎𝑐𝑙
2  
Oil price TERM_RISK_PA 𝑃𝑝𝑎
2 𝜎𝑝𝑎
2  
NG price TERM_RISK_NG 𝑃𝑛𝑔
2 𝜎𝑛𝑔
2  
Uranium price TERM_RISK_NU 𝑃𝑢𝑟
2 𝜎𝑢𝑟
2  
Correlation Coal-oil TERM_CORR_CLPA 2𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑝𝑎𝜎𝑐𝑙𝜎𝑝𝑎 
Correlation Coal-NG TERM_CORR_CLNG 2𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑃𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑛𝑔𝜎𝑐𝑙𝜎𝑛𝑔 
Correlation Coal-uranium TERM_CORR_CLNU 2𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑟𝜎𝑐𝑙𝜎𝑢𝑟 
Correlation Oil-NG TERM_CORR_PANG 2𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑃𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑔𝜎𝑝𝑎𝜎𝑛𝑔 
Correlation Oil-uranium TERM_CORR_PANU 2𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑢𝑟𝜎𝑝𝑎𝜎𝑢𝑟 
Correlation NG-uranium TERM_CORR_NGNU 2𝑃𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑟𝜎𝑛𝑔𝜎𝑢𝑟 
   
Price and correlated price risk for renewables are not present because there is no fuel price or 
correlated price risk associated with most renewable energy.  
Using the disaggregated metrics of PT risk as explanatory variables and price as dependent variable, 
the ordinary least squares regression model is shown in Equation 4.  
 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑠+. . . + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠 (4) 
where   
𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 = Weighted average price to industry in state s  
𝛽0 = ESICDKR intercept  
𝛽𝑘 = coefficients of  𝑋𝑘   
𝑋𝑘 = metric k of PT risk (detailed in Table 1)  
𝜀𝑠 = random error in ESICDKR for state s  
2.4. Resilience Index as a model for electricity price prediction 
Energy security indices are popular with respect to evaluating the energy security of a country 
against other countries and over time. Most have focused on the security of oil supply, but others 
have been constructed to include multitudes of variables including metrics for political risk, long-
term sustainability and governance (Kruyt et al., 2009).  Thresholds and limits of the metrics used 
tend to be subjectively applied by nominated experts. An alternate energy security index, the RI, was 
constructed to measure risk at all levels of the electricity supply process using thresholds and limits 
of country statistics rather than expert approximations (Molyneaux et al., 2012).  
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2.4.1. Calculating RI 
The individual risks measured by the index included: ENERGY USE (risk of price rises as a result of 
scarcity; EMISSIONS (risk associated with costs of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions); GENERATION 
EFFICIENCY (risk associated with additional costs from inefficient generation); DISTRIBUTION 
EFFICIENCY (risk associated with additional costs of inefficient transport of electricity); SPARE 
CAPACITY (risk associated with price increases because of insufficient capacity); DIVERSITY (risk 
associated with increased costs from fuel supply constraints); and IMPORTS (risk associated with 
being reliant on imports of fuel and electricity). The model here is adjusted to reflect constraints in 
data and the context of the periods.  
Firstly, distribution losses are excluded from this analysis. Interstate electricity transfers pre-1990 
are estimated by the EIA using, amongst other things, regional loss estimates. Applying regional loss 
estimates, assumes that distribution losses are constant across multiple states. For this reason, 
analysing distribution losses is meaningless.  
Secondly, CO2 emissions are excluded from the analysis. Control of CO2 emissions was not a cost 
factor during the 1970s and the finalisation of CO2 emission standards by the Environmental 
Protection Agency is only expected during 2015/6 (EPA, 2015). For this reason, CO2 emissions as a 
potential cost risk are not assessed for impact on price. 
Thirdly, the imports metric is an aggregate of imports of fuel for electricity generation and imports of 
electricity for electricity consumption. Fuel imports are subject to volatility in international, national 
and local fuel markets whilst imported electricity is dependent on local electricity generation 
capacity. Reflecting these different structural risks, the imports metric is disaggregated into 
electricity from imported fuels, and imported electricity.  
The RI, as analysed here, is composed of: energy use; generation efficiency; spare capacity; diversity; 
imports of fuel; and imports of electricity. The individual metrics are normalised, against best and 
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worst thresholds established by best and worst state performance, adjusted for a small margin of 
error of 5%, and then aggregated into a geometric mean, as shown in Equation 5. 
 
𝑥 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝑥 − min(𝑥)
max(𝑥) −  min (𝑥)
 (5) 
The endogenous thresholds are used in preference to subjective predictions of acceptable minima 
and maxima for each of the metrics. The calculation of the RI is shown in Equation 6. 
2.4.2. RI regression model 
The RI ordinary least squares regression model is specified in Equation 7: 
 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐼𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠 (7) 
where   
𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 = Weighted average price to industry in state s  
𝛽0 = ESICDKR intercept  
𝛽1 = coefficient of  𝑅𝐼𝑠   
𝑅𝐼𝑠 = RI for state s  
𝜀𝑠 = random error in ESICDKR for state s  
 
2.4.3. Disaggregated RI regression model 
An aggregated RI metric may mask the dynamics of individual metrics, so disaggregating RI may 
yield insights into which variables exert most influence. Table 2 details the variable calculations. 
Table 2: RI metrics as explanatory variables 
RI metric Regression Variable 
name 
Variable calculation 
Diversity DIVERSITY =1−∑ 𝑠2𝑛𝑖=1 ) 
Spare Capacity SPARECAP_GDP (maximum kWh possible - kWh 
generated)/GDP 
Loss in generation LOSSINGEN 1-(BBtu produced as electricity/BBtu 
 𝑅𝐼 = √𝑎. 𝑏. 𝑐. 𝑑. 𝑒. 𝑓
6  (6) 
where   
a non-renewable fuel used per kWh consumed  
b 1-(energy produced as electricity/energy consumed in generation)  
c (maximum electricity capacity - electricity generated)/GDP  
d Probability of electricity from a different fuel type  
e Proportion of energy generated from imported fuels  
f Proportion of electricity consumed from electricity imports or Proportion of 
electricity exported  
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consumed in generation) 
Non-renewable energy used ENERGYUSED non-renewable Btu used/kWh consumed 
Imports: fuel for generation IMPORTS_FUEL kWh from imported fuel / kWh generated 
Imports: electricity for 
consumption 
IMPORTS_ELEC If imports > 0,  
then kWh imported/kWh consumed, 
else kWh exported/kWh generated 
   
Adapting Equation 7 to allow for disaggregated metrics of RI, specifies: 
 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑠+. . . + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠 (8) 
where   
𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐾𝑅𝑠 = Weighted average price to industry in state s  
𝛽0 = ESICDKR intercept  
𝛽𝑘 = coefficients of  𝑋𝑘   
𝑋𝑘 = parameter k of RI risk (detailed in Table 2)  
𝜀𝑠 = random error in ESICDKR for state s  
2.5. Periods of analysis 
Figure 2 shows the progression of electricity prices in the US 1970-2012.  
 
Figure 2: Average US price of electricity to industry and oil spot price, 1970-2012  
 
Prior to 1973, oil prices had been low and stable. Due mainly to US support of Israel during the Yom 
Kippur war with Egypt, Arab states declared an increase in the posted price of oil and an embargo on 
the export of oil to most consumer countries in October 1973. This was the start of multiple, large oil 
price increases until June 1974. Then in late 1978, political disruption in Iran triggered oil prices to 
escalate dramatically again (Yergin, 1991). Prices peaked in 1980 before starting a slow decline. 
Electricity prices, being subject to regulatory review and determined by historical costs and profit 
levels, continued to rise through to 1982 before slowly declining from 1983.  
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A lengthy period of relatively stable and low oil prices followed. From 2003 a surge in global demand 
led to oil price increases not seen since the 1970s. The price escalation was interrupted by the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis, but surged again after 2009. During 2003-12, electricity prices increased, 
although not at the levels experienced 1973-1982. 
Based on the levels of oil price volatility, the periods analysed are 1973-1982 and 2003-2012. 
3. Results 
3.1. Analysing the impact of 1970s oil crises on price 
3.1.1. Portfolio Theory risk as predictor of price  
Figure 3 shows the relationship between PT risk, the composite metric, and price 1973-1982. The 
majority of states show low PT risk, with varying levels of pricing. Hawaii shows a high level of risk 
and high price. The fit for risk as a predictor of electricity prices is shown in Table 3. Whilst the 
composite metric for risk explains only 27.6% of the variation in price, the F statistic of 22.85582 
indicates a reasonable overall fit. The coefficient for risk is statistically significant although at 0.0062 
is small and most of the price prediction is explained by the average price across the states.  
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Figure 3: PT risk as predictor of price 1973-1982 
Whilst Hawaii may appear to be an outlier, excluding it increases the coefficient from 0.006228 to 
0.011527 but does not improve the fit. 
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3.1.1.1. Which risk variables are statistically significant as predictors of price  
The disaggregated risk variables explain 31.3% of the variation in prices which is an improvement on 
the fit for the composite metric at 27.6%. However, t-tests on the coefficients indicate that many of 
the variables are not statistically significant. Excluding the statistically insignificant variables, the 
remaining significant variables of TERM_RISK_PA and TERM_CORR_CLPA explain 34.9% of variation 
in price. 
Table 3: Regression analysis of PT variables as predictors of price 
 PT PT disaggregated 
variables 
PT stat-signfcnt 
variables 
Dependent variable  (Weighted average price 1973-82) ESICDKR_AVG 
Mean of dependent variable  0.099258  
Std Deviation of dependent variable  0.030340  
Regression  Least squares  
Observations  51  
    
Fit: R2 0.290219 0.450202 0.374694 
Fit: Adj R2 0.275733 0.312752 0.348639 
Fit: F-stat 22.85582 
(0.000045) 
3.275397 
(0.003547) 
14.38118 
(0.000013) 
    
Intercept (Prob) 
VIF 
0.090559 (0.0000) 
1.3 
0.086081 (0.0000) 
3.9 
0.089083 (0.0000) 
1.4 
    
Coefficients     
Single metric(Prob) 
VIF 
0.006228 (0.0000) 
1.3 
  
Term_risk_CL(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.002573 (0.9351) 
2.4 
 
Term_risk_NG(Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.013746 (0.2417) 
2.5 
 
Term_risk_NU(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.516463 (0.4130) 
1.8 
 
Term_risk_PA(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.006285 (0.0001) 
1.3 
0.006719 (0.0000) 
1.1 
Term_corr_CLNG(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.026603 (0.4898) 
2.2 
 
Term_corr_CLNU (Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.037847 (0.9193) 
1.6 
 
Term_corr_CLPA (Prob) 
VIF 
 0.057980 (0.0698) 
1.5 
0.074380 (0.0105) 
1.3 
Term_corr_NGNU (Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.526896 (0.2240) 
2.0 
 
Term_corr_PANG (Prob) 
VIF 
 0.028852 (0.0521) 
2.1 
 
Term_corr_PANU (Prob) 
VIF 
 0.152748 (0.4619) 
2.4 
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Jarque_Bera stat 
(heteroskedasticity, exists if > 5.99) 
2.195632 4.508548 3.773523 
Matrix condition index 
(multicollinearity, exists if > 15) 
3.4423 503.7042 22.2756 
    
The intercept reflects the average price across the states, with the coefficient for TERM_CORR_CLPA 
of 0.074 with 99% confidence of statistical significance predicting a strong impact on price. The 
graphical representation of the fit and residuals in Figure 4 shows low economic significance. The PT 
risk model predicts none of the benefit experienced by the hydro states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon 
and Washington in the form of very low electricity prices and price stability.  
 
Figure 4: Fit and residual analysis of statistically significant parameters of PT risk as predictors of price  
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3.1.2. Resilience Index as predictor of price 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between RI, the composite metric, and price. Lower prices are 
associated with higher levels of resilience.  
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Figure 5: RI as predictor of price 1973-82 
The fit for the RI as a predictor of price is shown in Table 4. The composite RI explains 18.6% of the 
variation in price, although the RI coefficient of -0.107047 with 99% confidence of statistical 
significance provides evidence of a sizeable negative relationship with price. 
3.1.2.1. Which RI variables are statistically significant as predictors of price 
The disaggregated variables of resilience explain 64.1% of the variation in prices. However, 
hypothesis tests on the coefficients indicate that many of the variables are not statistically 
significant. When the statistically insignificant variables are excluded from the model, the remaining 
LOSSINGEN, SPARECAP_GDP and IMPORTS_FUEL explain 63.4% of variation in price.   
LOSSINGEN, however, masks the different efficiencies associated with different fuel types and 
technologies. If LOSSINGEN is disaggregated into the percentage of generation from each fuel source 
(Pi in Equation 2), greater visibility of each fuel’s impact on price can be achieved. Including the 
percentage of all fuel types in regression analysis however could result in collinearity between the 
fuel percentage variables.  Thus, in recognition of the dominance of CL in electricity generation, 
CLPERC is excluded as an explanatory variable.  
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The explanatory variables that are included in the adjusted model, are NGPERC, NUPERC, PAPERC, 
REPERC, DIVERSITY, SPARECAP_GDP, IMPORTS_FUEL and IMPORTS_ELEC. These variables explain 
74.8% of the variation in price. The coefficients for NGPERC, NUPERC and IMPORTS_FUEL are very 
small and the hypothesis tests on the coefficients indicate a high probability that the coefficients are 
not statistically significant, so they are excluded from the model.  
Table 4: Regression analysis of RI variables as predictors of price 
 RI RI  
disagg. 
variables 
RI  
Stat-signfcnt 
variables 
RI adj 
W-
FuelPerc 
variables 
RI adj 
Stat-signfcnt 
variables 
Dependent variable (Weighted average price 1973-82) ESICDKR_AVG 
Mean of dependent variable  0.099258   
Std Deviation of dependent variable  0.030340   
Regression   Least squares   
Observations   51   
      
Fit: R2 0.202505 0.683774 0.656080 0.788649 0.780384 
Fit: Adj R2 0.186230 0.640653 0.634128 0.748392 0.755982 
Fit: F-stat 12.44239 
(0.000922) 
15.85687 
(0.000000) 
29.88660 
(0.000000) 
19.59019 
(0.000000) 
31.98066 
(0.000000) 
      
Intercept  
(Prob) 
VIF 
0.140695 
(0.0000) 
10.4 
0.41508 
(0.0022) 
25.0 
0.038134 
(0.0036) 
23.5 
0.110369 
(0.0000) 
21.4 
0.112084 
(0.0000) 
18.9 
      
Coefficients       
Single metric 
(Prob) 
-0.107047 
(0.0009) 
    
EnergyUsed 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.001058 
(0.2273) 
19.0 
   
Lossingen 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.093598 
(0.0030) 
56.2 
0.124238 
(0.0000) 
26.4 
  
Imports_elec 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.002524 
(0.8917) 
3.9 
 -0.028637 
(0.0084) 
1.8 
-0.026225 
(0.0098) 
1.6 
Imports_fuel 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.031783 
(0.0010) 
3.6 
0.026594 
(0.0023) 
3.0 
0.009373 
(0.3274) 
5.7 
 
Diversity 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.018865 
(0.1690) 
6.1 
 0.025875 
(0.0385) 
7.1 
0.028178 
(0.0074) 
5.0 
Sparecap_gdp 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.122260 
(0.0000) 
9.9 
-0.100925 
(0.0001) 
7.6 
-0.097249 
(0.0003) 
11.6 
-0.095639 
(0.0003) 
11.5 
NGperc    -0.003205  
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(Prob) 
VIF 
(0.8014) 
2.1 
NUperc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   0.003753 
(0.8105) 
2.3 
 
PAperc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   0.055855 
(0.0000) 
3.1 
0.061970 
(0.0000) 
2.4 
REPerc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   -0.059217 
(0.0000) 
2.3 
-0.061539 
(0.0000) 
1.8 
      
Jarque_Bera stat 
(heteroskedasticity  
exists if >5.99) 
4.96 0.69 1.79 1.22 1.65 
Condition index 
(multicollinearity  
exists if >15) 
9.1 168.0 12.9 5.3 14.2 
 
The explanatory variables of PAPERC, REPERC, DIVERSITY, SPARECAP_GDP AND IMPORTS_ELEC, 
explain 75.6% of the variation in price, as detailed in Table 4 with a good overall fit. The coefficients 
on fuel percentages provide a useful indication of how the price of electricity from different fuel 
sources varies from the intercept (which reflects the average price associated with CLPERC, NGPERC 
and NUPERC). The coefficients for PAPERC and REPERC, at +0.061970 and -0.061539 respectively 
with 100% confidence of statistical significance, show the additional price associated with electricity 
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Figure 6: Fit and residual analysis of statistically significant variables of RI as predictors of price 
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from PAPERC and the discount associated with electricity from REPERC. The coefficient for 
SPARECAP_GDP at -0.095639 with nearly 100% confidence of significance highlights the potential for 
spare capacity to exert downward pressure on price. The coefficient for IMPORTS_ELEC at -0.026 
with 99% confidence of significance shows modest downward pressure on price. Against 
expectations, the coefficient for DIVERSITY at +0.028 with 99% confidence of significance shows 
evidence of upward pressure on price.  Figure 6 shows the fit and residual analysis of the statistically 
significant RI variables on price.  
For completeness, alternative calculations for diversity shown in Table 5 were also analysed using 
single linear regression. However they showed no improved relationship between alternative 
measures of diversity and price.   
Table 5: Alternative measures of diversity analysed 
Measure of diversity Calculation  
Shannon’s diversity index  -∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑖  𝑝𝑖 = proportion of entity from ith type 
𝑠 = total number of entities 
Simpson’s Equitable diversity 
index 
𝐸 =
1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑠
𝑖=1
 𝑥 
1
𝑠
 𝑝𝑖 = proportion of entity from ith type 
𝑠 = total number of entities 
Hunter-Gaston index 
(Simpsons index sampling 
without replacement) 
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑠
𝑖=1
𝑠(𝑠 − 1)
 
𝑛𝑖= number of entities from ith type 
𝑠 = total number of entities  
  
3.1.2.2. Considering multi-collinearity 
Analysis of the coefficients indicates the possibility of collinearity between SPARECAP_GDP and the 
intercept. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), a measure of the inflation of a coefficient estimate due to 
collinearity, for SPARECAP_GDP is 11.5 and for the intercept is 18.9.  Collinearity is not considered to 
indicate mis-specification but rather the potential for unstable estimated regression coefficients. 
Acceptable levels of collinearity are based on rules of thumb, generally up to a VIF of 10 (Chatterjee 
and Hadi, 2006).  
Whilst the VIF for SPARECAP_GDP is higher than the usual threshold, there is little other evidence 
that collinearity is a problem in the model. Firstly, the adjusted R2 is not unusually high and increases 
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by only 0.079 when SPARECAP_GDP is added to the model. Secondly, when SPARECAP_GDP is 
removed from the model, the other variable coefficients adjust marginally and the coefficient for 
IMPORTS_ELEC reduces in statistical significance but the signs do not change.  Thirdly, the standard 
errors for SPARECAP_GDP and the other variables are small which does not point to collinearity. 
Fourthly, a correlation matrix reveals that there is some correlation between SPARECAP-GDP and 
CLPERC but it is only 0.431 while the correlation between SPARECAP_GDP and CLPERC-NGPERC-
NUPERC combined is 0.553. Fifth, the coefficient covariance matrix indicates little covariance 
between any of the coefficients or the intercept. Finally, Belsley et al propose that decomposition of 
the coefficient-variance matrix to establish the sensitivity of the estimated standard errors of 
regression coefficients to small changes in the data, can diagnose potential collinearity problems. 
This sensitivity is measured by the condition number of the matrix which is the largest condition 
index, calculated as follows:  
 𝐼 = √𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛⁄  (9) 
 
They find that the joint condition of high variance-decomposition proportions for two or more 
coefficients associated with a high condition number signals the presence of degrading collinearity. 
Condition numbers of 15 indicate some level of collinearity but over 30 indicate serious and 
degrading collinearity (Belsley et al., 2005). In this model, the condition number is 14.2, which points 
to acceptable levels of collinearity.  
In conclusion, it is to be expected that there will be some relationship between SPARECAP_GPD and 
CLPERC-NGPERC-NUPERC because they are the major sources of large generation.  Although there is 
some evidence of collinearity between SPARECAP_GDP and CLPERC, it is unlikely to diminish the 
results as presented in Table 4. 
3.1.3.   Comparing PT and RI variables as predictors of price 
TERM_RISK_PA predicts small impact on price but TERM_CORR_CLPA predicts large impact on price. 
However, TERM_RISK_PA and TERM_CORR_CLPA explain only 34.9% of the variation in price. By 
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contrast, the RI parameters of PAPERC and REPERC, SPARECAP_GDP, DIVERSITY and IMPORTS_ELEC 
explain 75.6% of the variation in price. DIVERSITY and PAPERC exert upward pressure on price whilst 
REPERC, SPARECAP_GDP and IMPORTS_ELEC exert downward pressure on price. The results, 
summarised in Figure 7, suggest that the RI variables are better at predicting price over the longer 
term than the PT variables.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Summary of PT risk and RI variables as predictors of price 
In theory, electricity from coal, natural gas and nuclear should have offered security from price 
volatility in the oil markets. PT indicates that correlation between oil and coal prices explains an 
increase in the price of electricity generated from coal, but fails to identify the benefits associated 
with diversification towards renewable energy. The improved fit of the RI suggests that the RI 
variables are more representative of the illiquid nature of the fleet and show the effect of the slow-
moving structural variables on price. Types of fuels used, which dictate technologies used and fuel 
import networks, are structural variables that change slowly over time, whereas price variance and 
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correlations are designed to measure short-term marginal benefits from switching between 
substitutes.  
3.2. Analysing the impact of oil demand growth 2003-12 on price 
US average electricity prices for industry remained at pre-1973 price levels from 1997 to 2002. 
However, in 2003 oil prices started rising again. In this period, prices in Hawaii were more than 3 
standard deviations higher than the rest of the country, as can be seen in Figure 8. Hawaii is 
therefore excluded as an outlier. 
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Figure 8: Prices to industry 2003-12 
3.2.1. Portfolio Theory variables as predictors of price 
As detailed in Table 6, PT risk explains only 7.4% of the variation in price, but disaggregating PT into 
its component metrics, shows the statistically significant independent variables explaining 63.1% of 
the variation in price. The coefficient for TERM_RISK_NU at 10.27375 with 94% confidence of 
significance shows a strong influence on variation in price. The negative coefficient 
TERM_CORR_NGNU with nearly 100% confidence of significance, appears to contradict the positive 
coefficient for TERM_RISK_NG. 
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The results are sufficiently unexpected to justify additional analysis. Checking for collinearity, VIFs 
range from 1.1 to 3.0 which are not high. However the matrix condition number of 6582 suggests 
serious collinearity (Belsley et al., 2005). Using fuel price variance multiple times within the 
calculation of PT risk, reiterates the same relationship with electricity price, so the existence of 
collinearity makes sense. Variables associated with variance decomposition proportions of greater 
than 0.5 include TERM_RISK_NU, TERM_CORR_CLNU, TERM_CORR_CLPA, TERM_CORR_NGNU and 
TERM_CORR_CLNG. The condition number reduces to 3.7 when these variables are excluded. Whilst 
collinearity does not predict mis-specification of the model, very high levels indicate that the 
coefficients are extremely sensitive to small changes in variable values and are therefore unreliable 
(Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006). Considering that the composite metric, PT risk, is not a good predictor 
of price and that it is inadvisable to rely on the coefficients of the disaggregated PT explanatory 
variables, it is suggested that only the explanatory variables TERM_RISK_NG and TERM_RISK_PA be 
included for analysis.  The Jarque-Bera stat however indicates heteroskedasticity which is only 
reduced under the test threshold of 5.99 when Alaska, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
California and Vermont are excluded.  With the remaining 43 states, TERM_RISK_NG and 
TERM_RISK_PA show small increases in coefficients and explain 63% of the variation in price. 
Excluding so many states from the analysis however complicates comparison with RI, so the 43 state 
model is excluded. 
Table 6: Regression analysis of PT risk variables as predictors of price 
 PT PT 
disaggregated 
variables 
PT stat-
signfcnt 
variables 
PT stat-
signfcnt 
variables 
wout 
collinear 
PT stat-
signfcnt 
variables 
wout 
collin&hetskd 
Dependent variable (Weighted average price 2003-12) ESICDKR_AVG 
Mean of dependent variable 0.073919  0.066128 
Std Deviation of dependent variable 0.024989  0.015926 
Regression   Least squares  Least squares 
Observations   50  43 
      
Fit: R2 0.093072 0.711348 0.683802 0.284068 0.649446 
Fit: Adj R2 0.074178 0.637335 0.631102 0.253603 0.631918 
Page 21 of 35 
 
Fit: F-stat 4.925941 
(0.031216) 
9.611076 
(0.000000) 
12.97545 
(0.000000) 
9.324360 
(0.000389) 
37.05251 
(0.000000) 
      
Intercept  
(Prob) 
VIF 
0.071842 
(0.0000) 
1.1 
0.064818 
(0.0000) 
3.4 
0.063650 
(0.0000) 
2.6 
0.067418 
(0.0000) 
1.2 
0.060546 
(0.0000) 
1.2 
      
Coefficients (Prob) VIF      
Single metric 
(Prob) 
VIF 
0.002741 
(0.0312) 
1.3 
    
Term_risk_CL 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.058358 
(0.351) 
2.9 
   
Term_risk_NG 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.013908 
(0.0000) 
1.5 
0.013798 
(0.0000) 
1.4 
0.015214 
(0.0000) 
1.2 
0.013362 
(0.0000) 
1.2 
Term_risk_NU 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 8.823021 
(0.1113) 
3.2 
10.27375 
(0.0590) 
3.0 
  
Term_risk_PA 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.001315 
(0.1817) 
1.5 
0.002065 
(0.0168) 
1.1 
0.001922 
(0.1051) 
1.0 
0.002136 
(0.0002) 
1.0 
Term_corr_CLNG 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.112245 
(0.0277) 
3.4 
0.158853 
(0.0003) 
2.3 
  
Term_corr_CLNU  
(Prob) 
VIF 
 -1.253339 
(0.0649) 
3.2 
-1.373458 
(0.0191) 
2.3 
  
Term_corr_CLPA  
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.334788 
(0.0021) 
2.0 
0.355043 
(0.0002) 
1.4 
  
Term_corr_NGNU  
(Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.696605 
(0.0203) 
4.2 
-0.947696 
(0.0001) 
2.4 
  
Term_corr_PANG  
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.031776 
(0.1955) 
1.9 
   
Term_corr_PANU  
(Prob) 
VIF 
 1.540874 
(0.1888) 
3.3 
   
      
Jarque_Bera stat 
(heteroskedasticity.  
exists if >5.99) 
16.49 4.14 15.00 29.07 4.85 
Matrix condition  
(collinearity,  
exists if >15) 
3.4 6800 6582 3.7 3.8 
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TERM_RISK_NG and TERM_RISK_PA as explanatory variables explain 25% of the variation in price. 
The regression results in Table 6 show that TERM_RISK_NG exerts upward pressure on price with 
nearly 100% confidence of statistical significance and TERM_RISK_PA exerts small upward pressure 
on price with 89% confidence of statistical significance. The F-stat indicates a good overall fit.  
Figure 9 shows the fit and residual analysis of the statistically significant PT variables as predictors of 
price. 
 
Figure 9: Fit and residual analysis of statistically significant PT variables as predictors of price 2003-12 (excluding HI) 
3.2.2. Resilience Index variables as predictors of price  
As detailed in Table 7, the composite RI explains only 3.2% of the variation in price. However, the 
statistically significant disaggregated RI variables, with fuel percentages substituted for LOSSINGEN, 
explain 72.4% of the variation in price. The coefficients for the fuel percentages indicate, with more 
than 99% confidence of statistical significance, that the price of electricity from: NG is higher than 
the average by 8c/kWh; nuclear is higher by 5c/kWh; and oil is higher by 5c/kWh. The increased 
price associated with electricity from NG is surprising in view of the large reduction in NG prices as a 
result of supply from unconventional sources, but confirms the finding in the PT risk analysis that NG 
price risk was associated with higher prices.  
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Table 7: Regression analysis of RI variables as predictors of price 
 RI RI  
disagg. 
variables 
RI  
Stat-signfcnt 
variables 
RI adj 
W.FuelPerc 
variables 
RI adj 
Stat-signfcnt 
variables 
Dependent variable (Weighted average price 2003-12) ESICDKR_AVG 
Mean of dependent variable 0.073919 
Std Deviation of dependent variable 0.024989 
Regression Least squares 
Observations 50 
      
Fit: R2 0.051388 0.317928 0.299996 0.759040 0.746856 
Fit: Adj R2 0.031625 0.222755 0.254344 0.712023 0.724354 
Fit: F-stat 2.600228 3.340530 6.571302 16.14408 33.19111 
      
Intercept  
(Prob) 
VIF 
0.094399 
(0.0000) 
14.3 
0.047730 
(0.0215) 
41.2 
0.064859 
(0.0000) 
10.8 
0.061477 
(0.0000) 
16.5 
0.060518 
(0.0000) 
6.8 
      
Coefficients (Prob) VIF      
Single metric 
(Prob) 
VIF 
-0.049933 
(0.1134) 
14.3 
    
EnergyUsed 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 9.07E-05 
(0.9541) 
34.9 
   
Lossingen 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.029599 
(0.4959) 
73.8 
   
Imports_elec 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.006380 
(0.8046) 
6.1 
 -0.009316 
(0.3096) 
2.1 
 
Imports_fuel 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.015927 
(0.2179) 
4.6 
0.020372 
(0.0489) 
3.0 
0.000820 
(0.9204) 
5.1 
 
Diversity 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 0.037361 
(0.0584) 
10.6 
 0.002676 
(0.8439) 
14.1 
 
Sparecap_gdp 
(Prob) 
VIF 
 -0.067451 
(0.0026) 
4.4 
-0.064977 
(0.0015) 
3.9 
-0.060671 
(0.0001) 
5.1 
-0.054312 
(0.0000) 
4.1 
NGperc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   0.087292 
(0.0000) 
2.7 
0.085848 
(0.0000) 
2.0 
NUperc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   0.047065 
(0.0022) 
3.7 
0.049304 
(0.0000) 
2.1 
PAperc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   0.054862 
(0.0048) 
1.7 
0.047133 
(0.0025) 
1.2 
REPerc 
(Prob) 
VIF 
   -0.007822 
(0.5133) 
2.3 
 
      
Jarque_Bera stat 13.86 11.57 9.56 2.96 4.22 
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(heteroskedasticity 
exists if >5.99) 
Condition index 
(multicollinearity  
exists if >15) 
10.4 187.5 8.0 14.5 9.1 
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Figure 10: Fit and residual analysis of statistically significant variables of RI on price (excluding HI) 
SPARECAP_GDP with a coefficient of -0.054 and 100% statistical significance is again found to 
provide downward pressure on price. The fit and residual analysis is shown in Figure 10. 
Assessment of collinearity shows that there is some relationship between SPARECAP_GDP and the 
intercept, with a VIF of 4.1 for SPARECAP_GDP. The condition number of 9.1 points to acceptable 
levels of collinearity in the model. 
3.2.3. Comparing PT and RI as predictors of price 
The PT statistically significant variables of TERM_RISK_NG and TERM_RISK_PA explain 25% of the 
variation in price. If multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity is ignored, PT risk variables explain 63% 
of the variation in price. The RI variables of NGPERC, NUPERC, PAPERC and SPARECAP_GDP explain 
72% of the variation in price. SPARECAP_GDP is a consistent predictor of lower prices. The fit of the 
model with the statistically significant RI variables shows more robust prediction of variation in 
prices than does the model with the statistically significant PT variables. 
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3.3. Other regression analysis matters 
Prior period price is excluded as an explanatory variable from the models. In analysing the models, 
where prior period price was included in the models, the absolute fit improved but the size and 
number of the statistically significant coefficients decreased. This suggested that prior period price 
masks the relationship between price and the structural variables. It is proposed then that the 
disaggregated metrics of PT and RI adequately identify the dynamics of the electricity system 
structure. 
Alternative functional forms were considered for regression analysis. In particular, log-linear models 
were considered for both PT and RI variables and found to provide no improved relationship 
information. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Is risk, as calculated by PT, an adequate predictor of resilience? 
Using fuel price volatility and price correlations as predictors of an electricity system’s response to 
energy shock does not appear to provide an adequate model for the calculation of resilience in the 
electricity system for 1973-1982 nor for 2003-2012. There is evidence of structural problems in the 
model, specifically significant levels of multicollinearity, which degrades the results. Regression 
analysis shows that the coefficients for a few variables of PT risk indicate higher prices but do not 
predict the low-risk, low-cost effect of renewable sources of generation on price.   
4.2. Is the RI an adequate predictor of resilience? 
The original variables of the RI are slightly better at predicting stable electricity prices during an 
energy shock than the PT variables. However, when the metric for energy efficiency, LOSSINGEN, is 
disaggregated into its component fuel source percentages, fuel source and SPARECAP_GDP show a 
reasonable ability to predict electricity prices during energy shocks.  This empirical analysis indicates 
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that spare capacity and the type of fuel used play an important role in resilience, but diversity, 
imports and energy efficiency do not.  
4.3. The role of diversity in resilience 
Diversity does not play a consistent role in the models. During 1973-1982, regression analysis 
indicates that diversity led to increased prices whilst during 2003-2012, there is little evidence from 
regression analysis that diversity plays any role in prices.  Greater stability in prices is associated with 
renewable energy more than with any combinations of fuel types especially during 1973-82.  
Table 8 shows prices for states with generation from a single dominant fuel source and states with 
mixed portfolios over the decades. Across the decades, the price of electricity for states with a mixed 
portfolio is higher than the US average. The price of electricity 1973-1982 increased by 34% for 
predominantly coal fired generation, 59% for natural gas generation and 67% for oil generation. 
States with high levels of hydro experienced no increase in prices. However, Washington and 
Oregon’s nuclear programs resulted in electricity prices rising after 1982. 
Table 8: Price of electricity by fuel source 1970-2012 
During the oil price surge 2003-2012, the average electricity price across all the states rose only 6 %. 
Coal prices and electricity prices from coal generation remained low. There is no evidence that 
declining NG price as a result of technological advances in unconventional production was passed 
through to electricity price.  Outside of the coal-oil-NG fuel nexus, electricity from nuclear sources 
$2012/kWh 1970-2 
Wtd-Avg 
1973-82 
Wtd-Avg 
1983-92  
Wtd-Avg 
1993-02 
Wtd-Avg 
2003-12 
Wtd-Avg 
1970-12 
Wtd-Avg. 
US average  0.064 0.099 0.091 0.065 0.069 0.079 
States with mixed 
generation portfolios 
0.074 0.108 0.111 0.084 0.077 0.100 
States with > 50% 
generation from: 
      
Coal  0.070 0.094 0.088 0.061 0.062 0.073 
Natural gas 0.059 0.094 0.128 0.115 0.120 0.104 
Nuclear n/a 0.105 0.120 0.098 0.099 0.087 
Oil 0.088 0.147 0.130 0.112 0.160 0.137 
Renewables 0.049 0.046 0.062 0.051 0.053 0.052 
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remained more expensive than that from coal and renewable sources despite its exceedingly low 
fuel requirements and mature technology. Electricity prices in states with high levels of renewable 
energy experienced small absolute increases in price from 2003-2012. Unlike 1973-82, states with 
mixed generation portfolios showed price decreases in 2003-2012. However, this decrease reflects 
historically high price mixed portfolio states like California and Massachusetts shifting from mixed to 
predominantly NG generation and historically low price coal generation states like Arkansas shifting 
to mixed portfolios.  
Figure 11: Average price of electricity to industry in states with dominant fuel source, and oil spot price 
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The weighted average price 1970-2012 shows a significant discount for industries doing business in 
states with high levels of renewables.  The pattern of prices among states is also evident in Figure 11 
which shows the progression of prices 1970-2012 for states with a dominant fuel source, and states 
with mixed generation portfolios. 
The conclusion drawn from these analyses is that the impact of an oil crisis on the US electricity 
systems is determined mostly by the individual performance of the fuel systems within each state 
and region, and by policy decisions which drive perceptions of fuel constraints. The calculation of 
diversity shows no role in price stabilisation, so it follows that the PT risk model will not be effective 
in predicting stable prices. Equally, the diversity metric within the RI will not measure resilience.  
The over-riding question is whether diversifying between fuels like coal, oil and gas serves as 
diversification, or merely as variation. Complex systems theorists have considered the difference 
between variation and diversity (Page, 2011). In this view, variation is difference within a type 
whereas diversity is difference of type. Whilst variation assists with adaptation by encouraging the 
establishment of niches, its effectiveness is limited to being able to respond to minor changes in the 
environment. By comparison, diversity creates synergies and overlap that facilitate robustness to 
major changes.  In the 1970s, shifts within fossil fuel types could have facilitated adaptation but the 
combination of policies pursued by the US federal government reduced the systems’ ability to adapt. 
The only fuel sources that offered diversification, rather than variation, were uranium and 
renewable (mainly hydro) systems. Reduced policy intervention in 2003-12, enabled generation to 
shift between fossil fuel types thus limiting the impact of rising oil prices on electricity systems. 
Notwithstanding the benefits associated with substitution in 2003-12, renewable energy provided 
the lowest priced electricity across both periods. 
4.4. The role of spare capacity in diversity 
As a metric of resilience, spare capacity as calculated in the RI is consistently associated with lower 
electricity prices. However, a requirement for spare capacity should not stop at electricity 
Page 29 of 35 
 
generation capacity. The requirement for spare capacity needs to extend to the inherent capacity 
within each fuel system which supplies electricity systems. An examination of these systems’ spare 
capacity during the crises produces a narrative of how spare capacity within all fuel systems 
influenced electricity prices. 
4.4.1. 1973-82 
When the Arab embargo of oil started in October 1973, the Texas Railroad Commission had recently 
removed all restrictions on US oil production removing capacity to adapt to the supply shock (Yergin, 
1991). This coincided with utilities transitioning to oil-and NG generation to prepare for sulphur 
emissions standards. Therefore, oil price escalation, facilitated by a lack of US spare capacity, 
increased generation costs and caused electricity prices to rise across the eastern states. 
After 1973 NG production declined across the US. The Federal Power Commission’s (FPC) regulatory 
power over NG interstate sales and prices halted exploration (NaturalGas.org, 2015) and reduced 
spare capacity.  Residential and small business consumers were given priority access to NG forcing 
generators onto alternative fuels (Woodmansee, 1972).  The Energy Supply and Environmental 
Coordination Act (US Government, 1974) and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (US 
Government, 1978), forced states that had traditionally relied on in-state affordable NG, like 
Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas, to fuel electricity generation with relatively higher priced ex-state 
coal. The shift to coal generation caused electricity prices in the NG-rich states to increase. 
The Appalachian coal region, the largest coal producing region in the US, struggled to meet demand 
in 1973 (Westerstrom, 1973). The Federal Environment Agency, in the Energy Supply and 
Environmental Coordination Act, legislated to prohibit the use of oil and NG in the generation of 
electricity (US Government, 1974). The perception that demand for coal would soar resulted in the 
coal price rising across the Appalachian states from an average of $10/ton to $20/ton between 1973 
and 1974 (Westerstrom, 1974) as shown in Figure 12. This could happen as the Nixon Wage-Price 
controls expired in April 1974 (Yergin, 1991). Analysts claimed that the age of cheap energy was over 
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(Fiscor, 2012). A lack of transport network capacity limited non-Appalachian producers from 
resolving the perceived supply-demand imbalance. Although production from the Great Plains 
region gradually increased, high transport costs to demand centres and lower heat value meant that 
coal prices in the Great Plains region did not rise as fast as eastern coal prices. A combination of a 
lack of spare capacity in coal production in the eastern coal region coupled with a lack of spare 
capacity in the transport network to the eastern demand centres, served to facilitate increases in the 
price of electricity from coal
 
Figure 12: Coal system regional responses 1972-1982 
The conclusion drawn about 1973-1982 is that the crisis was heightened and spread to electricity 
systems by a lack of spare capacity in oil, NG, coal  and coal-transport systems. 
4.4.2. 2003-12 
After more than a decade of low stable prices, growth in demand from China and India, the US-led 
invasion of Iraq and declining US production, caused oil prices to escalate from 2003. High oil prices 
facilitated investment in technology to release tight shale oil onto the US market, although 
production increased only after 2008 with US production levels recovering to pre-2003 levels after 
2010.  Access to tight shale oil released spare capacity for the oil system. 
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Prices for NG in the US were relatively high in 2003 reflecting declining US production levels. As with 
tight shale oil, technology increased access to tight shale gas with production increasing after 2006. 
A surplus in supply led to the price halving after 2008, and falling further after 2011. Access to new 
reserves provided the NG system with spare capacity. 
Coal prices increased only marginally from 2003-12. The lack of correlation with oil prices may have 
been as a result of perceived concerns over coal as a strategic source for energy in a carbon 
constrained world. It could also have been as a result of competition from cheaper NG. Figures 13 
and 14 show the fuel prices for electricity generation between the 2 different periods. 
 
Figure 13: Fuel prices for electricity generation: 2003-12 
 
Figure 14: Fuel prices for electricity generation: 1973-82 
The difference between the 1970s and the 2000s was the existence of spare capacity in coal and the 
emergence of spare capacity in NG and oil in 2003-2012.  
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5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Each fuel system is a complex web of structural variables, interconnected with other fuel systems 
through the ability of fuels to serve as substitutes. The price of each fuel reflects the dynamic 
structure of each fuel system. Where structural imbalances in supply or demand occur, price adjusts 
to reduce the pressure of the imbalance.  If substitution is possible, substitute fuel systems will 
supply into the constrained system to reduce pressure. This will increase the pressure in the 
substituting fuel system, causing both systems to reach a new extended equilibrium. Where policy 
interventions constrain the response of either system, the pressure from the original structural 
problem will shift to another, more responsive, substitute system.  
In 1973-1982, the consequences of historic policy interventions in the wake of the Natural Gas Act of 
1938, the curtailment plans associated with NG regulation, the Energy Supply and Environmental 
Coordination Act of 1974 and the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, reduced the 
ability of the NG systems to respond to the imbalance in the oil market. This shifted fuel supply 
imbalances to the coal industry and from there spread price increases to the electricity industry. The 
energy policy interventions which sought to control inflation and increase energy security shifted the 
contagion to all fuel systems, failing to isolate and contain it.  
By contrast, in 2003-12 energy policy interventions were limited to judicious drawdowns of oil from 
the strategic petroleum reserve in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina and 2011 after civil unrest in Libya. 
Prices in the oil and NG systems relieved the structural imbalances by stimulating technological 
advances. In effect, the lack of policy intervention ensured that the systems responded effectively to 
the energy shock. The price of uranium escalated in 2007 not due to scarcity but due to perceptions 
of increased demand and a potential scarcity of supply, which resulted in prices of electricity in 
states with predominantly nuclear power increasing unexpectedly.  
This is not the first study to identify that policy mechanisms in the 1970s exacerbated the energy 
crises but it is the first to highlight that a lack of spare capacity within fuel systems constrains 
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responses that can isolate and contain the original problem. Whether the lack of spare capacity was 
caused by legislation, or the lack of capacity resulted in legislation, the underlying trigger is that a 
fuel source is in some way constrained. Fuels that have to be found, extracted, transported and 
financed will always be vulnerable to constraints, structural imbalances and price volatility. Although 
spare capacity is crucial to isolate contagion, network structure also plays a role in the spread or 
control of contagion.  Restrictions placed on NG interstate sales and the lack of capacity in coal 
transport facilitated the rise of all fuel prices in the 1970s, whilst transport of NG and coal in the 
2000s facilitated the flow of fuels from areas with capacity to areas of structural imbalance, averting 
general fuel price rises.  
A preferable policy intervention is to increase the proportion of generation from fuel sources that 
are not substitutes and are not subject to systemic contagion; fuel sources that show diversity rather 
than variation. In the 1970s, there was investment in nuclear generation which was a diverse 
alternative but it was expensive, subject to the availability of uranium and safety costs. In 2003-2012 
oil price contagion spread to uranium, perhaps identifying that uranium, like NG, offers variation 
rather than diversity. Most renewable energy, however, is subject to system constraints that are 
independent of fossil fuel system constraints making them an excellent counter to systemic 
contagion. Geographic limitations of hydro-electricity, and the immaturity of other renewable 
technologies, eliminated wide-spread roll out of renewable energy options during and after 1973-
1982, but that is no longer the case in 2015. The 2003-2012 technological advances in oil and NG 
production and effective fuel transport networks served to provide access to spare capacity to avert 
structural imbalances and avoid the consequences of the 1973-82 crises. The technology 
breakthrough that stopped high-price contagion was however due more to luck, than good strategy. 
If energy policy is to address resilience in energy it needs to ensure that critical fuel systems have 
adequate spare capacity to respond to unexpected threats and that truly diverse fuel sources are 
readily available at sufficient scale to contain any threat of systemic contagion.  
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Notes 
                                                          
i The estimations of net interstate electricity transfers 1970-1989, as calculated by EIA SEDS, involve total 
energy estimates that are considered by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to be inappropriate (TAYLOR, Y. 
22 January 2014 2014. RE: Historic Data. Type to MOLYNEAUX, L.). An alternative method has been devised in 
this paper to calculate net interstate transfers 1970-1989. States are separated into Western Interconnection 
and Eastern Interconnection to reflect the larger transmission distances in the former. Generation, plus net 
international electricity flows, less consumption, calculates interstate transfers.  The totals provide the average 
electricity loss percentage for each interconnection area. The interconnection area electricity loss percentage 
is applied to each applicable state to calculate net interstate transfer. Equation A details the calculation: 
 NET INTERSTATE TRANSFERS  = GENERATION + NET INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS – 
CONSUMPTION – (ESTIMATED INTERCONNECTION LOSS PERCENTAGE * GENERATION) 
(A) 
Equation A calculates net interstate transfer estimates that appear consistent with data reported 1990-2012. 
